Russia and Christianity

Christianity was adopted by the medieval state of Kiev in 988, and this is often regarded as the founding event of Russian Orthodox Church. Initially, the Russian church was subordinated to the Patriarchate of Constantinople, the eastern branch of the Christian religion, as opposed to the western branch which was based in Rome. However, in 1448, the Russian church declared itself independent in the context of a rapidly declining Byzantine empire, Constantinople being taken over by the Ottoman Turks – Muslims – five years later. From this point on, the Russian Orthodox Church, now headquartered in Moscow, represented the biggest organization of Eastern Christianity.

During the medieval period, the Grand Dukes of the state of Moscow always had influence over the affairs of the church, participating in its deliberations, and this tutelage continued with the establishment of tsarism in 1547, when Ivan IV of Moscow was declared autocrat of the emerging Russian Empire. From 1652 a significant schism emerged in church, as the Moscow patriarch, with the support of Tsar Alexis I (r. 1645-76), ordered a revision to the liturgy and the rites of the church. These innovations were rejected by a large minority of the faithful, who from this point on were termed 'Old Believers'. Over time, many of these came to resent Tsarist intervention in church affairs, an antipathy which was intensified with the church reforms of Peter I (r 1682-1725). In 1721, Peter established a governing synod of the church made up of both bishops and his own lay appointees, a body which took over the authority previously enjoyed by the Patriarch of Moscow. From this point on, it became fairly clear that the Russian Orthodox Church was to serve as a branch of the Tsarist state and that ultimate authority over every aspect of its life would lie with the tsar himself.

Because of the fusion of the church with the state in this manner, a long tradition of religious dissidence exists in Russia, much of which protested the dominance of the Christian church by the state. The Old Believers were persecuted for centuries, their views being declared illegal and their publications suppressed. Later, those refusing to participate in the official church could be subject to punitive taxes, and only marriages taking place in official churches were recognized as legal. Old Believers were not allowed to construct their own church buildings, ring bells or hold public processions. At a later stage, western protestant groups were also subject this type of restrictions and among the Russian peasantry, rebellious attitudes towards the authorities often expressed themselves using religious ideas and through underground religious organizations.

Russian Marxists and Anarchists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were generally sympathetic to this type of Christian dissidence. Though atheist in outlook, they understood the anti-authoritarian impulses behind it and the tendency of the peasantry in particular to express its discontent using traditional religious ideas. This rebellious moods were understood by Russian Marxists as a contributing factor to Russia's coming democratic revolution, which would establish freedom of conscience and organizations, whilst removing punitive taxes and ending arbitrary administrative treatment dealt out to religious dissidents.

At the same time, there was little evidence that these groups would be won over to the Marxist conception of socialism in any simple way: their rebelliousness often contained plainly reactionary features, including misogynist, patriarchal attitudes, support for independent as opposed to collective forms of labour, and opposition to Russia's economic modernization.

In these respects, religious rebels were viewed as a fairly authentic representative of a radicalized and impoverished peasantry who could serve as an ally of the urban working class in a democratic revolution against tsarism, but who fundamentally aimed at establishing small-proprietor agriculture free of debt, tax and mortgages rather than a socialist planned economy. Having obtained these goals with the help of a democratic, constitutional state, Marxists expected the peasantry to then politically separate on class lines - petty-bourgeois landowners and employers versus landless labourers - once the question of a transition to socialism was posed. Socialists would naturally seek allies among the latter, many of whom would usually move to the cities in search of work for at least part of the year, and who would on returning to the countryside spread the influence of labour movement socialism among rural proletarians in place of dissident Christian doctrines.

Indeed, the most radical wing of Russian Marxism, represented by figures such as Lenin and Trotsky clearly understood that the process of class polarization within the Russian peasantry was well underway by the end of the nineteenth century and consequently supported agitation among the peasantry not simply for democracy, small-proprietor agriculture and religious freedom, but also on the basis of socialism, the assumption being that the most far-sighted peasants would understand that their current economic conditions were not sustainable, and that a great number of them would eventually be 'proletarianized' as a matter of course.

One key consequence of the Russian Orthodox Church's subordination to the Tsarist state was the role it ended up playing in helping control and persecute all real and perceived enemies of the tsarist regime, and not simply dissident Christians. In the early nineteenth century and in response to the influence of the French Revolution and Napoleon, Tsar Nicholas I (r. 1825-55) introduced the vaguely defined principles of 'Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality' as a sort of state ideology. This resulted in the exclusion of enlightenment ideas such as rationalism, science, atheism and progress from both the education system and the press, the latter being heavily censored. The doctrine, whilst clearly privileging the Russian Orthodox Church was explicitly anti-semitic, a crucial feature given the several million Jews living in the Russian empire and was also provocative towards the predominantly Catholic Poles, whose rebellions against Russian rule were suppressed in 1791, 1830 and 1863. The policy led on the one hand to attempts to 'Russify' traditionally non-orthodox populations, including Protestants in the Baltic states, efforts towards which were largely futile.

Indeed, in the nineteenth century, state and church sponsored anti-semitism became an established feature of Russian life. Often coinciding with Orthodox religious festivals, anti-Jewish riots ('pogroms') appear to have been used as a means of promoting loyalty to the state in response to the activities of revolutionaries. Often following a church service, riots would break out and the police would do nothing to intervene, even though they responded to strikes and demonstrations with maximum brutality. The pro-regime press also usually played a role, but the church at no point condemned these outrages, which usually resulted in numerous killings and the destruction of Jewish property. In response the assassination of Alexander II by revolutionaries in 1881, Jews (with the exception of rich merchants) were expelled from Kiev and Moscow and forced to reside in the 'Pale of Settlement', the western territories of the Russian Empire currently located in Poland, Belarus, the Baltic states and the western Ukraine. Women who refused to leave were to be registered as prostitutes. The state-controlled church naturally did nothing to protest these horrific policies, a key model for Nazism, and it clearly benefited from the favourable treatment of the government.

This complicity of the Orthodox Church with tsarist despotism extended to the latter's policy towards the labour movement. By the mid 1890s, mass strikes involving tens of thousands of workers had gripped the textile industries of Moscow and St Petersburg, even though workers' organizations were illegal. In response, the Head of the Moscow secret police, SV Zubatov initiated a series of patriotic and pro-church trade unions. Unfortunately for him, the workers who joined these unions rapidly acquired ideas not at all in accordance with the 'three principles' of the Russian state, and in defiance of their leaders went on strike, causing Zubatov to lose his job. However, the priests' influence on the labour movement continued up to 1905, the workers' march to the Winter Palace on 9 January being lead by a former Zubatovist priest GA Gapon, who appears to have retained connections with the secret police despite appearing to have joined the revolutionary movement.

Though the February revolution of 1917 did little to change the status of the Orthodox Church, the October Revolution separated the church from the state, and established the freedom of religious practice and the equality of faiths before the law. Church records regarding birth marriages and deaths were handed over to the state and all reference to citizens' religious denomination was removed from official documents. All education facilities run by religious organizations were taken over by the state. The teaching of religion was banned from all schools, though individuals were free to practice and take religious instruction in their spare time. Monasteries and seminaries were allowed, but religious organizations were denied the right to impose religious discipline on their members, to punish them or to demand subscription money. Voluntary donations were permitted but the ownership of property was not: all church property was thus nationalized, but the faithful were allowed to participate in its management of the facilities they used, such as church buildings and their contents. As a non-labouring class, the clergy were denied the vote.

In the light of these measures, it is perhaps unsurprising that the leaders of the Orthodox Church began to vocally campaign against the Bolshevik government at a time when civil war between the supporters and opponents of Soviet power was breaking out across the country. Subsequently, large sections of the church subsequently openly associated themselves with the anti-Soviet 'White' armies, and new leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Tikhon of Moscow, anathematized the Bolsheviks.

Despite this opposition activity, the Orthodox church was tolerated once peace was restored though openly counter-revolutionary elements inevitably faced persecution by the Soviet authorities. Patriarch Tikhon was pressured to renounce his early anti-soviet positions in return for toleration and complied. Simultaneously, a political campaign was waged to develop forms of the Orthodox faith that were compatible with Soviet power. This resulted in the so-called 'Living Church' movement, which had its basis in rank-and-file priests and certain Christian socialist groups which had emerged during 1917. This faction of the church, supported by the Soviet government eventually carried out a coup against the church hierarchy in 1922. This 'Higher Church Administration' pressured bishops to accept Soviet power on behalf of rank and file priests, the effect being something of a class war emerged within the clergy. Reforms were introduced, promoting marriage among monks and bishops (to whom marriage had previously been forbidden) thus making their situation the same as those of ordinary priests and allowing ordinary, married priests to be promoted to leading positions in the church. The liturgy was also translated from Old Slavonic into modern Russian and religious services were also reformed in an attempt to make them appear more democratic.

The result of these changes was a new schism in the church between the pro-Soviet 'renovationists' and the traditionalists. In 1923, with the relaxation of civil-war era repressive measures against the latter, they reorganized and started to increase their influence. In 1927 most of the traditionalists declared that they recognized Soviet power, and in doing so struck a blow against the 'renovationist' opponents and against the reforms of the early twenties. The traditionalist synod was recognized by the Soviet government in turn and in this way, a counter-revolution in the Orthodox church seems to have begun. However, these new developments were not entirely regarded with favour by the Soviet regime. It seems that the traditionalists managed to hold on the loyalty of the majority of the Orthodox faithful, the conclusion being drawn that the 'renovationist' movement was no longer serving as an effective tool for drawing the most conservative sections of public opinion into the revolution and was, on the contrary, itself becoming more conservative. From this point on, the state took a somewhat more aggressive approach to both factions of the orthodox church. Numerous churches buildings were closed down from 1928 usually for violating part of the ever more complex regulations to which legal religious associations had to submit. Some church buildings, including the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow were destroyed completely. Taxes were raised on religious premises and the clergy were in some places excluded from consumer associations, one of the main means of acquiring consumer goods.

At a later stage this campaign against religion was reversed as the increasingly socially conservative minded Soviet bureaucracy sought agreement with the 'traditionalist' wing of the Orthodox church. The church's nationalism, silence on social and political issues and now consistent preaching of loyalty to the Soviet state came to ensure that by the 1940s, it was no longer a threat. In 1936, the clergy were for the first time granted political rights, though in practice, as with everybody else, the exercise of these was fairly limited in an atmosphere of growing Stalinist terror. This perhaps surprising reversal appears to reflect the transformation of the Communist Party's social base, so that it no longer orientated towards radicalized workers but conservative career bureaucrats, apparatchiks intellectuals and other members of the 'Soviet middle class' who were more suited to the weekly consolations of religion than the day-day-day struggles of the working class. Significantly, the nationalism of the church was particularly useful to the Soviet regime during the World War Two, which was framed less as a form of international class struggle for socialism and against fascism, as a 'Great Patriotic War' to defend and extend the borders of the Soviet Union. In 1941, a large number of churches were opened again in response to the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union.

The Russian Orthodox Church continued to expand its influence until the death of Stalin in 1953, but faced greater disapproval under Khrushchev, who not coincidentally supported a limited cultural and intellectual 'thaw' in public life. The church continued to be harassed, but their structures remained in tact, complete with seminaries, monasteries and Theological Academies, though all of which were carefully supervised by the authorities. The result was a rather contradictory situation. On the one hand, religion as whole faced official disapproval on the grounds that it was incompatible with 'Marxism-Leninism', the official doctrine of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the regime wanted to maintain control over all aspects of public and collective life, including religious worship, and clearly feared driving a largely harmless activity underground, where it could be the target of infiltration by foreign or rebellious forces. Thus the party, the education system, the media and films continued to take a negative attitude towards religious practice whilst continuing to tolerate it, with the effect that the church doubtless appeared to many somewhat in the role of 'loyal opposition' to the regime. Having said that, the revelations in the 1980s of the degree to which the both overseas affiliates of the church and its priests in Russia had served as conduits for KGB espionage indicates that directing discontent into harmless channels was not the only purpose the church was tolerated and to a degree cultivated by the authorities in the Brezhnev, Khrushchev and Gorbachev eras.

In the post-Soviet period, religious organisations were mostly freed of much of the rather pettifogging legislation which had previously hampered their activities and in particular their ability to raise money. This liberalisation appears to have provided the opportunity for the Russian Orthodox Church to convert itself during recent times into a fairly serious capitalist concern. During the 1990s, and despite the continued legal separation of the church and state, the Yelstin government granted Orthodox Church the right to import tobacco products free of tax, a nefarious source of income which contributed to the re-establishment of the organisation's financial independence and wealth at a time of general poverty among the Russian population. These activities since developed into quite a web of business interests, including trade in alcohol, oil and jewelry, rendering the church in the eyes of many to be something akin to a corporation disguised as a religion. On the basis of all this commercial activity, numerous churches have been restored and rebuilt in great luxury, including the spectacular, and spectacularly expensive Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow. Equally remarkable are the tastes of the church's current leader, Partriarch Kirill of Moscow, who appears to have taken an unusual perspective on the Christian injunction that 'man should not live by bread alone'. This individual, who has taken monastic vows, was recently photographed with a Swiss watch on his wrist estimated to be worth several tens of thousands of pounds and when confronted with the fact, appears to have had several of the offending photographs inexpertly airbrushed.

In terms of its religious policy, the Kremlin currently appears to distinguish between 'traditional' religions ‒ Christianity, Judaism Islam and Buddhism ‒ and other minority faiths, occasionally directing harassment at the latter, especially foreign missionaries, whilst cultivating pro-regime representatives of the former, whose political preferences are suitably reactionary on all the appropriate issues: the status and role of women, LGBT rights and the role of religion in education. In 2010, religious education was introduced into Russian schools for the first time since 1918, with courses focusing on the four major religions and secular ethics. Strengthening the connections between church and state, President Putin has been particularly keen to associate himself with the Orthodox church as a political and electoral tactic, receiving explicit support from Patriarch Kirill during his 2012 presidential election campaign. This was despite the fact that mass demonstrations were taking place against Putin's continued grip on political power and the corrupted legislative elections of December 2011. In the midst of this crisis, it seems that the Russian leadership was trying to use the Orthodox Church as a means of legitimizing itself at a time of growing public restiveness.

One more disturbing feature of the Russian Orthodox Church's recent political development is its willingness to associate with far-right groups, including neo-fascists, on demonstrations whilst at the same time appearing to receive the support of the government. On 15 April 2012 an astonishing photograph was taken showing an Orthodox priest side by side with a young man wearing a swastika t-shirt, which was apparently taken on a church procession at which the self-proclaimed 'People's Militia of Minin and Pozharsky' appear to have obligingly provided 'security'. In the half-hearted apology subsequently issued by the church, it appeared to defend its decision not to remove the individual in question and further photographs show the presence of a no less than ten white gold and black tricolour flags, a well-known emblem of Russian monarchists and far right groups. In line with these unusual sympathies, a senior member of the church hierarchy recently posed the question of whether the works of Lenin and Trotsky ought not to be suppressed in line with Putin's vague legislation against 'extremism'. The recent controversy over the band 'Pussy Riot' only appears to have strengthened the church's link with far-right thugs, claims being made that vigilante groups have been mobilized to 'defend' churches from 'attacks' by hostile forces. Usually the brutal activities of these types, directed against ethnic minorities and those with 'western' lifestyles, including skateboarders and rap fans, go un-investigated by the police. Similar groups have been known to physically attack Gay Pride demonstrations, as was the case in May 2012.

The Committee for a Workers' international has a section operating in Russia and it frequently has to respond to the aggressive interventions of the Orthodox religion into political life. However, the experience of our Russian section is not particularly unique, as privileged and reactionary official and semi-official religions can be found in most societies and this always plays a factor in politics where the religious feelings and identity of the population are strong. The Church of England is in theory a state religion in England, and the Roman Catholic Church has historically had immense influence in Irish, southern European and Latin American society. In the Middle East and south Asia, states often give official sanction to either Sunni or Shiia varieties of Islam, discriminating against the opposing denominations and sometimes against Christians. The Israeli state is a Jewish state which viciously discriminates against non-Jewish Israelis. Hindu chauvinism is an established feature of Indian political life.

In general terms, socialists support the right of individuals to practice religion just as much as they support the right of individuals to propagate atheism. Religious organizations should be freed to promote their views in public, including political views, and they should not be subject to state interference or participation in their internal governance. At the same time no religion should be given privileges and the state should not discriminate in favour of or against a particular religious group. It should not protect religious groups from criticism using laws against blasphemy and attacks on religion that amount to inciting hatred should be countered mainly through political means (i.e. debate and campaigns) rather than using laws against freedom of expression. Socialists should expose the reactionary, misogynist, pro-captialist and homophobic character of much mainstream religion whilst remaining sensitive to the fact that many religious believers do not share such views.

Religious organizations should not be given financial privileges and they should be funded solely by contributions from those who participate in their activity. Religions which operate as capitalist concerns should be treated as such. Socialists support the wholesale nationalization of society's main economic resources and their integration into an economic plan subject to strict democratic controls 'from below'. Religious organizations which currently hold significant assets in land, real estate, shares and the like would lose their wealth under socialism, and in doing so be obliged to live somewhat more in accordance with the principles they preach. The immensely valuable cultural objects found in churches, palaces, temples and the like would become public property and would be maintained at the public expense, primarily as historical artifacts, as important monuments of national or even world history. That minority of the population who currently use these facilities for the purpose of worship would be allowed to do so.

Socialists opposed the intervention of religious organizations in education, the health service and other social services. This is because public services should serve every member of society equally and should not privilege a dominant religious group or serve as an opportunity to propagate religious views. Their should be no prayers or religious services in the education system and attempts to introduce religious doctrines into the science curriculum should be resisted with especial vigor. At the same time, socialists support the right of workers in the public services to wear articles connected to faith that do not prevent them carrying out their duties in the normal fashion. The same can be said of school students: socialists defend their right to wear items of religious clothing to school.